It is frequently observed that the implementation of green policies is delayed compared to the initial announcement. Considering a setting with a representative monopolist extracting a nonrenewable resource, we demonstrate that announcing a green policy, but then delaying its implementation, is associated with a larger cumulative extraction at any point in time than announcing a late implementation of this policy at the outset.
Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol is widely recognized as a milestone of international climate change policy. By agreeing to reduce the carbon dioxid emissions substantially, many countries are pursuing the goal of dampening the greenhouse effect. This effect is driven by cumulative fossil carbon extraction. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, went into force in 2005 and specifies greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for 37 countries. The socalled "first commitment period" covers the years [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Since a successor agreement had already been planned at the outset in the 1990s (see Jus and Meier, 2014 , and the references cited therein), and as many countries were about to fail their specified targets, there have been initiatives to negotiate a successor of the Kyoto Protocol since the 2007 Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNCCC) in Bali (COP13). Effectively, this evolution is tantamount to postponing the original goals to a future point in time. Indeed, at the 2011 UNCCC in Durban an "Ad Hoc Working Group" was appointed to develop a proposal for a new protocol by the 2015 UNCCC (COP21) which is then supposed to be implemented from 2020 on. These protracted negotiations also show features of delaying the expected implementation of stricter policies to the future. In addition to this international problem, there are several cases on a national level in which announced climate policy measures have been cancelled or delayed later on. Among these is Australia's plan to introduce an emission trading scheme. A National Emissions Trading Taskforce, established in January 2004, proposed the implementation of a capand-trade system by 2010 (National Emissions Trading Taskforce 2006), which was eventually delayed in April 2010 until after 2012, and has been replaced by the introduction of a carbon tax as of July 2012 (Clean Energy Bill 2011) . This Australian carbon tax has been abolished in July 2014. In the United States, the American Clean Energy and Security Act -also a proposal for an emissions trading scheme to start in 2012 (H.R. 2454 (2009)) -was adopted by the House of Representatives in 2009, but further steps have been delayed by the Senate since then. South Korea and Japan also have set out plans for emission trading schemes to be implemented in 2013, but implementation in both countries will probably be delayed due to industry opposition (Maeda 2010; Sopher/Mansell 2013) .
In this paper we argue that announcing, or creating the expectation of, the adoption of measures in the future, but then delaying their implementation, has a twofold negative effect on climate. As repeatedly demonstrated in the literature, owners of fossil resources tend to accelerate their extraction in anticipation of a stricter climate policy in the future, which is known as the Green Paradox (Sinn 2008) . This happens because a policy-made reduction of the marginal profits in the distant future induces more extraction in the near future. We show that if the policy is not implemented at the announced date, but delayed to some later date, resource owners are able to increase their total profits by once again shifting extraction quantities forward. During this interim period with less strict climate policy, resource owners raise their extraction once more. Due to the delay, their marginal profits turn out to be higher than they had expected before. The resulting cumulative extraction path is higher than if no policy at all had been announced and implemented. It is also higher than if the date of the eventually implemented policy is announced upfront rather than being the result of an implementation delay. While there is already a substantive literature dealing with announcement effects in environmental policy, our contribution lies in analyzing the consequences of delaying the implementation.
A number of papers discuss the effects of climate policy announcements relative to immediate action, see the survey by van der Werf and Di Maria (2012) . The main supply-side channel states that resource owners extract non-renewable resources quicker as a response to announced stricter environmental policies. This is exemplified by Sinn (2008) based on the model of Hotelling (1931) . Similar results have beeen derived in different frameworks by Long and Sinn (1985) , Sinclair (1992) , Eichner and Pethig (2011 ), Hoel (2011 ), Hoel and Jensen (2012 , and Di Maria et al. (2012) . More specifically, unit taxes that are expected to rise faster than the relevant discount rate of the resource owner will accelarate extraction, while decelaration may occur with a declining, constant, or slowly rising tax. Very high taxes do not only affect the timing of extraction, but can also prevent full exhaustion by being prohibitive from some date on. A tax that is initially higher than the original resource rent slows down extraction independent of future tax expectations (Hoel 2012) . Further, announcing an environmental tax will increase extraction during the period before the measure is implemented. Finally, when a temporarily binding emissions cap is employed, extraction may rise both before and after this cap period (Di Maria et al. 2012) . Focusing on consumers, Smulders et al. (2010 Smulders et al. ( , 2012 show that announcing climate policy well in advance comes along with an unintended effect from the demand side. Households anticipate a price increase at the implementation date of a stricter policy and accumulate capital more quickly, where a higher capital stock is associated with more fossil fuel consumption. In contrast to this literature, Kennedy (2002) argues that overly hasty emission reduction policies increase the compliance costs by being more distortive than if more time is available for the adjustment. By now, the empirical evidence on Green Paradox effects is mixed (Di Maria et al. 2014) . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. After deriving the main results in Section 3, the final Sections 4 and 5 discuss the findings.
The model
We consider a monopolist extracting a non-renewable resource. The initial stock of the resource is x(0) = x 0 > 0. Time is continuous and runs from t = 0 to infinity. The instantaneous extraction at date t is q(t). For simplicity, the instantaneous profit function without taxation is time-invariant and denoted by π 0 (q). The analysis would undergo only slight changes if π 0 is interpreted as a baseline profit function at some low and constant tax rates. We impose lim q→0 π 0 (0) = ∞, π 0 < 0, and the existence of a finite Cournot quantity (referring to Cournot's (1838) standard monopoly model) q 0 , satisfying π 0 ( q 0 ) = 0. The first condition may be replaced by lim q→0 π 0 (0) = b > 0, implying a full extraction of the resource in finite time. At date t = T 1 , a unit tax θ(t; T 1 ) is introduced, which can also be interpreted as a cost to satisfy a new environmental standard or as a price of a permit to extract the resource. Marginal profit changes to π 1 (q; t; T 1 ) = π 0 (q) − θ(t; T 1 ). Appendix A shows that qualitatively similar results are obtained if a profit tax at rate τ is implemented at date T 1 . In order to neutralize the impact of discounting, the unit tax is designed so as to increase at the interest rate r > 0, which we assume to be time-invariant: θ(t; T 1 ) = θe r(t−T 1 ) . In fact, the literature has repeatedly pointed out that the Green Paradox results depend on whether the growth rate of the unit tax exceeds or falls short of the interest rate (eg. Sinclair 1992; Sinn 2008) . The Cournot quantites q 1 (t; T 1 ) under the specific tax are defined by π 1 ( q 1 ; t; T 1 ) = 0. Imposing the condition
ensures that taxation only affects the timing of extraction, while cumulative extration,
q(t)dt, will always converge to the initial stock. We take a partial equilibrium approach and ignore repercussions of lower profits and redistributed tax proceeds on demand. In the basic model, the policy switch is announced at date t = 0. The law of motion governing the evolution of the stock of the resource iṡ
Let I(t) denote an indicator function with
The monopolist maximizes the present value of its profits,
The current-valued Hamiltonian is
where μ represents the costate variable. The optimal solution satifies the conditions
and
Equation (5) states that at each point in time the value of the costate variable is equal to the instantaneous marginal profit. Condition (6) implies that the costate variable grows at the constant rate r. Therefore, the solution describing the trajectory of the costate variable can be written as
where μ(0) is a positive constant, its value being determined by (5), (6) and the boundary conditions x(0) = x 0 and lim t→∞ x(t) ≥ 0, where the latter will obviously be satisfied with equality.
Note that (5) in combination with the condition
that μ > 0 at any point in time. Marginal profit is always positive because otherwise the present value of profits could be increased by reshuffling extraction away from dates with π i (q) ≤ 0. Recalling the strict concavity of the profit function (π 0 < 0), a positive marginal profit implies that extraction always falls short of the respective Cournot quantity. The necessary optimality conditions imply that marginal profit increases at rate r. Since extraction will always fall short of the static Cournot quantity and since the marginal profit is diminishing in output, extraction decreases over time. When the policy switches at T 1 , there is a discontinuous fall in extraction. This occurs because the change in marginal profit is governed by r and does not jump on an optimal extraction path given perfect anticipation of the tax path. Since the tax decreases all marginal profit levels, the extraction quantity is cut accordingly at the moment at which the policy is implemented. Having a unit tax growing at the discount rate r does in itself neither accelerate nor decelerate extraction. This can be demonstrated as follows. As
differentiating with respect to time yields
Comparing growth rates, we obtain
. Growth rates of marginal profit on a given extraction path are unchanged if
which holds if and only if
The consequences of delaying green policies
In a first step, we demonstrate that cumulative extraction at any point in time t > 0 will be higher than in the zero tax baseline scenario if the regime switch is announced at t = 0 for date T 1 , and implemented accordingly. Thus, confirming the Green Paradox, announcing green policies accelerates extraction. We proceed by comparing the policy of a switch at T 1 to delaying its implementation until T 2 once the originally scheduled switching date T 1 is reached. The thought experiment is the following. At T 1 , the implementation of the policy is delayed until T 2 , which comes as an unforeseen shock to the monopolist. Up to T 1 , the monopolist believes that at T 1 the announced policy will actually be set in place. At all times between T 1 and T 2 the monopolist believes that the new announcement will be set in place, and the policy is actually implemented at T 2 . It turns out that this policy of delaying again increases cumulative extraction at any given point in time after announcing the new policy. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (i) Announcing at t = 0 a green policy with a unit tax θ(t; T 1 ) to start at T 1 > 0 increases cumulative extraction at any point in time t ∈ (0, ∞).
(ii) Announcing at t = 0 the implementation of the green policy at T 1 , but delaying it until T 2 > T 1 at date T 1 further increases cumulative extraction at any point in time t > T 1 .
Proof.
Recall that the costate variable satisfies (7), where μ(t) > 0 always holds due to
Let q i (μ) ∈ 0, q 0 be uniquely defined by π i (q i ) = μ, i ∈ {0, 1}. From equation (5) it is obvious that q 1 (μ) < q 0 (μ) for a given μ > 0 and a unit tax applying for π 1 only. The resource constraint implies
at any point in time.Consider first the comparison between announcing and implementing a green policy at T 1 to no green policy at all, being equivalent to T 1 = ∞. We denote by μ (t; T 1 ) the value of the costate variable at date t in anticipation of a policy change at T 1 , with μ (t; ∞) representing the corresponding value if no green tax policy is announced. Instantaneous extraction q(t; T 1 ) and the corresponding levels of the resource stock x(t; T 1 ) are defined accordingly. Let the optimal extraction path without tax be q(t; ∞), with corresponding costate variables μ(t; ∞). Keeping this path unchanged while implementing the tax policy would yield μ(t; T 1 ) = μ(t; ∞) for t ∈ 0, T 1 ) and μ(t; T 1 ) < μ(t; ∞) for any t ≥ T 1 . However, since the costate variable has to grow at rate r, it follows that μ(t; T 1 ) < μ(t; ∞) at any point in time t. Due to (5), this implies q(t; T 1 ) > q(t; ∞) for any t ∈ 0, T 1 ) , ensuring x(t; T 1 ) < x(t; ∞) for any t ∈ (0, T 1 ].
Observe that lim t→∞ x(t) = 0, and x(t) > 0 at any finite t. Since moreover x(T 1 ; T 1 ) < x(T 1 ; ∞) and both marginal profit levels increase at rate r, the relation q(t; T 1 ) < q(t; ∞) holds for any t > T 1 . Suppose that instead q(t; T 1 ) ≥ q(t; ∞) for some fixed T > T 1 . This would require that the costate variables satisfy μ T; ∞ ≥ μ T; T 1 + θ(t; T 1 ).
Since the LHS and the RHS of the respective inequality grow at rate r, this would imply q(t; T 1 ) ≥ q(t; ∞) for all t > T 1 , which contradicts lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 in combination with x(T 1 ; T 1 ) < x(T 1 ; ∞). This suffices to guarantee x(t; T 1 ) < x(t; ∞) for any t ∈ (0, ∞).
Delaying the implementation to T 2 once T 1 is reached induces the monopolist to reoptimize the extraction path, giving rise to a new optimal path of the costate variable μ (t; T 1 , T 2 ) . Since a given extraction quantity q now yields a higher marginal profit in the interval (T 1 , T 2 ), there is a jump in the costate variable at the date at which the delay is announced, that is μ(t; T 1 , T 2 ) > μ(t; T 1 ) for any t > T 1 . Due to (5), this yields q(t; T 1 , T 2 ) < q(t; T 1 ) for any t > T 2 . Since lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 and x(t) > 0 at any finite t, it follows that
Moreover, as the pre-delay marginal profit path as well as the new one increase at rate r, re-optimizing yields q(t;
. This would require that the costate variables satisfy μ T; T 1 , T 2 ≤ μ T; T 1 + θ(t; T 1 ). Since the LHS and the RHS of the inequality grow at rate r, this would imply q(t;
The proposition can be interpreted as follows. On the optimal path, the intertemporal arbitrage condition of the monopolist implies that instantaneous marginal profit grows at the interest rate. This holds regardless of the realization of anticipated tax changes. If the marginal profit curve shifts downward due to the introduction of a tax, a discontinuous fall in extraction occurs at the switching date. Delaying the implementation of a tighter policy increases some future marginal profit levels and raises the value of the costate variable. Consequently, extraction will increase during the period with the no-tax policy and decrease during the period with the tax policy. Therefore, announcing the policy increases extraction in analogy to the Green Paradox logic, and delaying gives additional incentives for early extraction until the actual implementation date. Proposition 2 states that the announcement-cum-delaying policy also fares worse than announcing the late implementation date immediately. Note that the thought experiment behind the announcement-cum-delay policy is the same as in Proposition 1. In the alternative immediate announcement scenario, the monopolist believes from date t = 0 on that the tax policy is implemented at T 2 , and this happens indeed.
Proposition 2. Announcing at t = 0 the implementation of the green policy at T 1 , but delaying it until T 2 > T 1 at date T 1 increases aggregate extraction at any point in time t ∈ (0, ∞) compared to announcing the same policy at t = 0 to start at T 2 and implementing it accordingly.
Proof. We compare correctly anticipating T 2 as the switching date to first expecting T 1 , which is then postponed to T 2 once T 1 is reached. Since μ (0; T 1 ) < μ (0; T 2 ) and since the costate variable grows at rate r, it follows that μ(t; T 1 ) < μ(t; T 2 ) at any point in time. Due to equation (5), this yields q(t; T 2 ) < q(t; T 1 ) for any t ∈ 0, T 1 ) , implying
When the policy is delayed at T 1 , a jump in the costate variable occurs. Since the remaining tax path is identical under both policies and π 1 < 0, the lower remaining stock translates into a higher value of the costate variable, μ(t; T 1 , T 2 ) > μ(t; T 2 ) for any t > T 1 . Therefore, q(t; T 1 , T 2 ) < q(t; T 2 ) for any t > T 1 . Recalling that lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 and
Announcing an earlier rather than later implementation of a given green policy induces a higher extraction until the announced early implementation date, similar to the announcement effect in Di Maria et al. (2012) . The policy is delayed when this date is reached, and it comes to reoptimization of the extraction path. But now the monopolist faces the same remaining policy path as in the scenario in which the later date was announced right at the outset. Since everything is equal except for the stock of the resource, at each point in time more is extracted in the case of a larger stock. As the two paths converge only as time goes to infinity, cumulative extraction is always higher when a more ambitious green policy is announced for an earlier date, but then delayed.
Caveats

Credibility
Our analysis assumes that all policy announcements are taken for granted and that announced policy changes are perceived as credible. Given the evidence on protracted negotiations before policy changes are enacted, an alternative vantage point is to stay in doubt about the implementation of announced policies. For example, there may be uncertainty about the starting date of implementation of the policy, being announced for T 1 . Dealing with uncertainty, the resource-extracting monopolist uses some probability distribution z(T) with respect to the starting date so as to maximize expected profits. Typically, we will have z(T) = 0 for T < T 1 and positive support, z(T) > 0, on some interval T 1 , T m . In terms of our approach, he may maximize
z(T) I(t; T)π 0 (q(t)) + (1 − I(t; T)) π 1 (q(t); T) e −rt dtdT
with
and π 1 (q(t); T) = π 0 (q(t)) − θ(t; T). At some date t ≤ T 1 , some new information on the starting date will arrive, possibly an announcement of a delay of the implementation of the tax policy until T 2 . This will induce the monopolist to revise his expectations on the probability distribution z(T), having some impact on his resource extraction plan. As a result of uncertainty and limited credibility, extraction should be lower in early periods, and the revision will typically be less sensitive to new announcements. At the same time, qualitative reactions will generally move in the same direction as in our basic model of full credibility. However, these messages have to be taken with caution given the possibility of strategic interaction between resource owners and policy-makers. If the decision to postpone the implementation of environmental taxes occurs as a response to perceived high current extraction, such endogeneity of policy again favors high early extraction.
New technologies
An important counter-argument against our story why an announcement-cum-delay policy accelaterates the greenhouse effect is related to the development of new technologies.
The announcement can encourage the development of an alternative clean backstop technology. While the delay in itself will then slow down its further development, the new technology is closer to introduction than without the announcement before. This can be illustrated as follows. Let X ≥ 0 denote investment in the new technology, being meant to reduce unit production cost c. The R&D process may be described by
with g(c, 0) = 0, g 1 < 0, g 2 ≤ 0 and g 22 > 0. Unit cost will never fall below c min , hence g 2 (c min , X) = 0. Consider a representative firm developing a backstop technology, which is a perfect substitute for the resource under conderation. Let the entrant maximize the present value of its profits,
where demand y e (p e , p i ) = 0 if p e > p i , with p e and p i denoting the prices of the entrant and the incumbent monopolist, respectively. The main idea is that the entrant, given a credible perspective that the old technology is driven out ouf the market, first invests into R&D to bring its unit cost down. When the new technology becomes competitive, due to a combination of research effort and taxes on the old technology, there will be some brief intermediate period in which both technologies are sold in the market. Ultimately, the old technology drops out due to further increasing taxes. Announcing a tax scheme may then accelerate the development of the new technology as investment in R&D is expected to pay off earlier.
When it comes to a delay, the investment path has to be adapted. Presumably it is slowed down. However, comparing announcement-cum delay to an immediate announcement of the ultimately implemented policy, a counterargument arises. When the delay is announced, remaining policies are identical. However, with the earlier announcement, cumulative R&D investment is presumably higher, such that unit cost of the substitute is lower. In this situation, the replacement of the old by the new technology can come about earlier, thereby reducing overall emissions. Such a scenario may be particularly relevant if the tax path with sufficiently high initial tax θ 0 already reduces the final cumulative extraction below the initial stock. In such a situation, the optimization problem of the monopolist becomes essentially static, extracting static Cournot quantities at any point in time. It does not make sense to extract more as instanteneous profit would go down, without any advantage in the future.
Discussion
The policy implications of our analysis are obvious. If the aim of climate policy is to decelerate the speed of resource extraction, one way to achieve this is by implementing a green policy, for instance a carbon tax, that becomes laxer over time, as stressed by Sinclair (1992) and others. If such a policy is not feasible or if it cannot be implemented immediately due to political constraints, announcing a policy for some later point in time leads to more extraction until then, as already noted by Di Maria et al. (2012) . This could be seen as the price of not being able to implement the policy immediately. However, whatever policy is announced for the future, delaying this policy shortly before it was supposed to be implemented is detrimental in terms of the goal to dampen the greenhouse effect. Delaying the implementation gives resource owners unexpectedly more time to extract and sell before the policy is actually implemented. Therefore, it increases the speed of extraction.
Notice that the result is independent of extraction cost levels. If we had the realistic scenario of a cost function which increases in the level of cumulative extraction, the mechanisms driving our results are only slightly modified. Since stock-dependent extraction induces a negative impact on current extraction on future profits, the growth rate of instantaneous marginal profit will fall short of the interest rate, as demonstrated in Appendix B. Also, the results carry over to modifications in which an economic exhaustion is reached in finite time. In this case, delaying a previously announced policy may in addition have the effect that a larger share of the initial resource stock would be extracted and less would remain in the ground once economic exhaustion is reached. Further, the qualitative results will generally also hold for alternative market structures of the resource extraction industry. Indeed, the impacts of policy annnouncements of implementation and delay of a green policy on the optimization problem of the firm are quite similar in any case and will occur regardless of the question whether or not it is able to influence the market price. Hence, though our model introduces several simplifying assumptions, the results presumably turn out to be robust for many alternative specifications.
Appendix
A Profit tax
It can be shown that qualitatively similar results are obtained if the tax being announced and implemented is a profit tax at rate τ instead, reducing marginal profit to
The profit tax has no impact on static Cournot quantities, thus q 0 = q 1 in this case. While the optimization problem and first-order conditions are perfectly analogous to the case of the unit tax the proof of Proposition 1 has to be adapted as follows. Proof. Recall that the costate variable satisfies (7), where μ(t) > 0 always holds due to (5) in combination with q 0 = q 1 > 0. Let q i (μ) ∈ 0, q 0 be uniquely defined by π i (q i ) = μ, i ∈ {0, 1}. From equation (5) it is obvious that q 1 (μ) < q 0 (μ) for a given μ > 0 and a profit tax applying for π 1 only. The resource constraint again implies (8) at any point in time.
Consider first the comparison between announcing and implementing a profit tax at T 1 to no profit tax at all, being equivalent to T 1 = ∞. We denote by μ (t; T 1 ) the value of the costate variable at date t in anticipation of a policy change at T 1 , with μ (t; ∞) representing the corresponding value if no green tax policy is announced. Instantaneous extraction q(t; T 1 ) and the corresponding levels of the resource stock x(t; T 1 ) are defined accordingly. Since at any given extraction path marginal profit is lower from t = T 1 on, and since the costate variable grows at rate r, it follows that μ(t; T 1 ) < μ(t; ∞) at any point in time t. Due to (5), this implies q(t; T 1 ) > q(t; ∞) for any t ∈ 0, T 1 ) , ensuring
Observe that lim t→∞ x(t) = 0, and x(t) > 0 at any finite t. Since moreover x(T 1 ; T 1 ) < x(T 1 ; ∞) and both marginal profit levels increase at rate r, the relation q(t; T 1 ) < q(t; ∞) holds for any t > T 1 . Suppose that instead q(t; T 1 ) ≥ q(t; ∞) for some fixed T > T 1 . This would require that the costate variables satisfy μ T; ∞ ≥ μ T; T 1 / (1 − τ ) .
Delaying the implementation to T 2 once T 1 is reached induces the monopolist to reoptimize the extraction path, giving rise to a new optimal path of the costate variable μ (t; T 1 , T 2 ) . Since a given extraction quantity q now yields a higher marginal profit in the interval (T 1 , T 2 ), there is a jump in the costate variable at the date at which the delay is announced, that is μ(t; T 1 , T 2 ) > μ(t; T 1 ) for any t > T 1 . Due to (5), this yields q(t; T 1 , T 2 ) < q(t; T 1 ) for any t > T 2 . Since lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 and x(t) > 0 at any finite t, it follows that x(t; T 1 ) > x(t; T 1 , T 2 ) at any t ≥ T 2 . Moreover, as the pre-delay marginal profit path as well as the new one increase at rate r, re-optimizing yields q(t; T 1 , T 2 ) > q(t; T 1 ) for any t ∈ (T 1 , T 2 ). Suppose that instead q(t; T 1 ) ≥ q(t; T 1 , T 2 ) for some fixed T ∈ (T 1 , T 2 ). This would require that the costate variables satisfy μ T; T 1 , T 2 ≤ μ T; T 1 / (1 − τ ). Since the LHS and the RHS of the respective inequality grow at rate r, this would imply q(t; T 1 ) ≥ q(t; T 1 , T 2 ) for all t ∈ (T 1 , T 2 ), which contradicts x(T 1 ; T 1 ) = x(T 1 ; T 1 , T 2 ) in combination with x(T 2 ; T 1 ) > x(T 2 ; T 1 , T 2 ). Therefore, cumulative extraction at any point in time t > T 1 fulfills x(t; T 1 , T 2 ) < x(t; T 1 ).
B Stock-dependent extraction cost
As an alternative to our reference scenario of a fixed extraction cost, consider a unit extraction cost function c(x) with c (x) ≤ 0, expressing that a lower stock of the resource x is generally associated with a higher extraction cost. Let instantaneous revenue be given by R(q) with lim q→0 R > 0 and R (q) < 0. The Hamiltonian reads
where θ(t; T 1 ) = 0 for t < T 1 . This yields first-order conditions
which can be rearranged to obtaiṅ
Since the costate variable is still equal to marginal profit according to (14), the growth rate of marginal profit falls short of the interest rate whenever the extraction cost rises with a declining stock of the resource in ground. However, as marginal profit and unit tax no longer grow at the same rate, the unit tax policy will also change the extraction path if being implemented immediately. To keep marginal profit growing at the rate determined by (16), pre-tax marginal profit must grow at a higher rate than in the no-tax scenario. Accordingly, the extraction path has to be adapted so as to start at lower pre-tax marginal profit, equivalent to higher extraction. Thus, apart from an effect of announcing and delaying, a unit tax rising at the interest rate will also speed up the optimal extraction path when c (x) < 0. However, given realistic values of c (x) and r, this additional impact will often remain comparatively small in size.
